and CEO. Hartford stock fell 3.4% on that day, and continued to fall 5.7% the next day. Both successors are from outside the hiring firm, but one key difference between them is that Benmosche was formerly a CEO while McGee was not. Though market reactions to these succession announcements could be purely random, and there could be other factors behind their stock price movements, the issue of prior CEO experience of outside CEO successors is, nevertheless, important and warrants a closer look, especially if hiring an experienced CEO can help to turnaround a troubled company.
The study of CEO turnover remains an important research topic in part because the current economic climate has increased turnover rates. Research by Chicago-based executive recruitment firm Challenger Gray & Christmas has estimated that 1,484 CEOs left their jobs in 2008, the equivalent of six every working day, the most since the company began monitoring the market in 1999. Virtually all academic research on successor CEO origin focuses on the distinction between outside successors and those from inside the company. In prior decades, inside succession was considerably more common than outside succession (Helmich, 1974; Dalton & Kesner, 1983; Friedman & Singh, 1989) . However, in recent years, the trend has reversed: Huson, Parrino and Starks (2001) find that the frequency of outside successions has increased from the 1970's to the 1990's. Murphy and Zabojnik (2007) In contrast, during the 1990s more than one in four CEOs were hired from outside the company, and in the first half of the 2000s almost a third of all CEOs were hired from outside the company.
In addition, Murphy and Zabojnik (2007) indicate that the percentage of outside hires with prior experience as a CEO of a publicly traded company has risen from less than 20% in the 1970s
to nearly 50% in the 1990s. The average number of firms where the new CEO had been a prior CEO has nearly tripled over this time period (since many of the newly appointed CEOs had held this position at several firms previously). The average number of prior corporate employers has risen significantly from the 1970s (when the typical CEO had been employed by an average of 1.88 other corporations) to the 1990s (when the typical CEO had been employed by an average of 2.72 other corporations).
Agrawal, Knoeber and Tsoulouha (2006) argue that outside CEO successors are handicapped in the sense that they are only chosen if they are much better than the best insider candidate. Companies often appoint an outside candidate when its prior performance has been poor and when the situation calls for new direction (Cannella and Lubatkin, 1993; Davidson, Worrell & Dutia, 1993; Kesner & Sebora, 1994) . As a result, the stock market tends to react more positively to the announcement of outside CEO appointments than to inside CEO appointments (Lubatkin, Chung, Rogers & Owers, 1989; Borokhovich, Parrino & Trapani, 1996; Huson, Malatesta & Parrino, 2004) .
Though the research on outside CEO succession has been extensive, there has been little research on the differences between outside CEO successors who have prior CEO experience versus those without CEO experience. Murphy and Zabojnik (2004, 2007) argue that a successor's general managerial skills may be more important than his firm-specific skills. The requirement for firms. In addition, hiring an outsider with prior CEO experience may reduce the uncertainty that an outsider brings to the new firm because the candidate with prior CEO experience has a track record as CEO that the new firm, the stock market, and the firm's other constituents can observe.
In this paper, we compare the antecedents and consequences of firms that hire outsiders with prior CEO experience to those outsiders that do not have this experience. First, we examine the stock market reaction to the succession announcements. We find that the market reacts positively to succession announcements when the successor has prior CEO experience but not when the outside successor lacks this experience. Second, we examine the financial performance of these two groups of firms prior to the succession. We find that firms hiring a CEO with experience have a worse financial condition (measured by their Z-scores) and higher debt ratios than those hiring a nonexCEO. Third, we compare the outsiders' previous firms. Non-exCEOs come from larger firms than exCEOs, but other performance measures show no significant differences. Fourth, we examine the pay of the two groups of successors. Surprisingly, there is no consistent significant difference in compensation, both in amount and in structure, between an exCEO and a non-exCEO, though both increase significantly in amount from that of the predecessor's and that of their previous positions. Finally, we examine the financial performance post-succession. After hiring an exCEO, the successor firms still have worse financial performance than non-exCEO successor firms, and the pre-to-post change in performance is insignificant between the two groups of successors.
We organize the remainder of the paper as follows. Section 2 reviews past literature on CEO turnover and succession with a focus on successor origin. Based on the literature review, we establish six testable hypotheses. In section 3 we discuss the sample and data. In section 4 we F o r P e e r R e v i e w 4 discuss our results. Section 5 summarizes robustness checks with alternative factors. Section 6 concludes.
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT

Outsider Succession Literature
There is considerable literature on the origin of CEO successors. Some of this research has found that firms tend to hire outside successors when their performance has been poor (Boeker & Goodstein, 1993; Cannella & Lubatkin, 1993; Davidson, Worrell & Dutia, 1993; Kesner and Sebora, 1994) . One conclusion from this research is that companies appoint an outside successor when there is a need for a new direction in hope of improved performance.
As a result, investors usually welcome the hiring of an outside successor. Lubatkin, Chung, Rogers and Owers (1989) , document a positive reaction from the stock market at the announcement of the hiring of an outside CEO, especially for firms that had poor prior performance. Positive market reactions to the hiring announcements of outside successors have also been documented in Reinganum (1985) , Chung, Lubatkin, Rogers, and Owers (1987) , Warner, Watts, and Wruck (1988) , Borokhovich, Parrino, and Trapani (1996) and Davidson, Nemec, Worrell, and Lin (2002) . Huson, Malatesta, and Parrino (2004) find that firm performance does improve following the appointment of an outside CEO, and the stock market reacts positively to the appointment and to the later improved performance. Murphy and Zabojnik (2004, 2007) 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60   F  o  r  P  e  e  r  R  e  v  i  e  w   5 decisions. The industry effect on governance has also been documented by Jenter and Kanaan (2008) ; poor industry performance and even poor performance of the entire market are not filtered out by corporate boards in CEO dismissal decisions. As a result, poor industry and market conditions significantly increase the chance of forced CEO turnovers. However, Kaplan and Minton (2006) show that it is only the internal turnovers that are significantly related to three components of firm performance-performance relative to industry, industry performance relative to the overall market, and the performance of the overall market, while external turnovers are not significantly related to any of them. Industry effects may also be present in board hiring decisions. Parrino (1997) argues that succession decisions may be influenced by industry specific human capital of successor candidates. In addition, the stock market reacts more positively to announcements of outside successions when the outsider comes from the same industry as the new firm (Davidson, Nemec, Worrell, and Lin, 2002) . Due to the extensive research in industry origin of CEO successors, we control for the industry effect in our analyses in this paper.
Antecedents to Hiring a Successor with CEO Experience
What would prior CEO experience do for a successor candidate? CEO experience would
give the successor experience with the demands of being at the helm of an organization. While outside successors either with or without CEO experience would need time to learn about their new company, the non-exCEO would also have to learn to be a CEO. The exCEO, on the other hand, would likely have a shorter learning curve having already experienced the demands of a CEO position. In addition, having CEO experience would lessen the uncertainty that is inherent in a succession decision. The new firm and the market can view the experienced candidate's Prior research has documented that firms are more likely to hire outsiders rather than insiders following poor performance. The goal of hiring an outsider under these conditions is to make changes that will improve the financial performance of the firm. We propose that firms with poor performance will want an experienced leader as the successor; therefore, firms that hire successors with CEO experience will have worse prior financial performance than firms that hire outside CEOs without CEO experience. This provides our second hypothesis. Ocasio (1999) proposes that firms rely on informal rules of appropriateness to keep organizational activities on track particularly in ambiguous situations. Hiring an outsider without CEO experience creates more uncertainty than when the outsider has CEO experience. Following the rules of appropriateness if a firm hiring an outside successor cannot hire an experienced CEO then the prior performance, size and industry of the successor's prior firm may become more important to their hiring decision 1 . Since the board is not hiring an experienced outsider, the board must be able to justify its decision; it can do so by hiring an outside candidate from a larger firm that is performing well. Since the board can justify its decision to hire an exCEO based on the candidate's experience at the helm, the issue of the prior-firm performance and industry would play a smaller role in the board's decision. This provides our third hypotheses:
1 Note that this does not mean that firms hiring exCEOs do not consider the performance of the previous firms the successor comes from. 
Outsider Successor Bargaining Experience
If the goal of executives is advancement then the CEO position would be highly coveted.
Being hired as a CEO would bring the executive to the top position in the company. Once a board makes the decision to hire an outside successor, the CEO candidate and board would negotiate the position. While there would be many potential issues to negotiate, compensation amount and structure for the successor would be a potential negotiation topic. A candidate for the position who does not have CEO experience may have a reduced bargaining position when compared to the candidate with CEO experience. The outside successor that is already CEO has achieved this position already. To be attracted to the new position the experienced CEO may want to be compensated more.
Firm performance and CEO turnover have been the focus of many corporate governance studies for years. The importance of firm performance in CEO turnover has been examined extensively in studies such as Puffer and Weintrop (1991) , Gibbons and Murphy (1992), Murphy (1999) , Engel, Hayes and Wang (2003) , Farrell and Whidbee (2003) , Kaplan and Minton (2006) , and Jenter and Kanaan (2008) . However, Tosi, Werner, Katz and Gomez-Mejia (2000) test the relation among firm size, performance and CEO pay, and find that firm size accounts for more than 40% of the variance in CEO pay while firm performance accounts for less than 5%. Apparently, firm size is also a big, if not bigger, factor in determining CEO compensation. Then, how much are firm performance and firm size related to CEO compensation in the exCEO vs. non-exCEO comparison? Cao and Wang (2008) show that in CEO contracting, total compensation is used to induce retention while pay-at-risk is used to induce effort as a response to the risk involved in hiring a candidate. Rajagopalan (2003, 2006) state that hiring an outsider successor can impose higher risk to the hiring company. Then, the hiring of an exCEO would lower some of the uncertainty associated with hiring an outsider. Combined with the greater bargaining position of the experienced CEO, the compensation (adjusted for firm size) would likely be greater for the experienced outside CEO successor than for the outside successor without CEO experience. This provides our next hypothesis: 
Do Firms that Hire Experienced CEOs Achieve Better Performance?
If firms hire outside CEOs with CEO experience in an attempt to improve poor prior performance, then an important question is whether this strategy is worth it. Hiring an experienced CEO from the outside, one with a relatively short learning curve, may be able to find solutions to the problems that created the poor performance. We, therefore, propose that hiring an outsider with CEO experience is more likely to bring improved financial performance than hiring an outsider without CEO experience. So, our final hypothesis is:
H 5 : Firms that hire exCEOs experience better performance and bigger performance gains post hiring than firms that hire Non-exCEOs.
DATA
We identify CEO succession announcements through ExecuComp and LexisNexis from 1993 to 2008, and find 613 firms that have CEO turnovers; this number includes both inside and outside successions. We use the "SIC" column in the ExecuComp database which provides the last fourdigit Standard Industrial Classification code of the firms to eliminate regulated financial services firms (SIC is 6020-6799) and public utilities (SIC is 4911-4932). We exclude regulated firms because they likely have systematically different compensation schemes due to restrictions on their investment opportunity sets (DeFusco, Zorn & Johnson, 1991; Smith & Watts, 1992; Gaver & Gaver, 1993) . This filter deletes 61 firms from the sample (14 financial services firms and 47 public utilities). The sample decreases to 552 CEO turnovers. We then match the sample with the CRSP database for data on stock market reaction, the ExecuComp database for compensation data and the COMPUSTAT database for data on firm performance. in three previous firms and 2 (1.4%) in four previous firms.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Market Reaction to Outside Succession
We have hypothesized that the market will react more positively to outside CEO succession announcements when the outsider has prior CEO experience. To address this hypothesis we conduct an event study with the succession announcement taking place on day 0. We examine the following event windows (0, 0), (−1, 0), (0, +1), and (−1, +1) for short-term effect and for long-term effect, the two windows of (−20,−1) and (0, +20). The details of our event test procedure appear below.
We first estimate a single index market model from day −300 to day −46 relative to day 0:
where:
R it = the return on security i at day t;
R mt = the return on the equally-weighted market index at day t.
We then obtain the abnormal return for security i on day t:
We compute the cumulative abnormal returns from day t 1 to day t 2 for security i, CAR i (t 1 ,t 2 )
as:
AR where t 1 = -20, −1, 0, and t 2 = −1, 0, +1, +20
For a sample of N securities, we obtain the mean cumulative abnormal return, CAR(t 1 ,t 2 ), as:
If there is no abnormal stock price movement, then CAR(t 1 , t 2 ) would not be statistically different from zero. To test the statistical significance of CAR(t 1 , t 2 ), we first use the parametric Patell Zstatistic, and follow it with a non-parametric generalized sign Z statistic. We further compare the abnormal returns of the exCEO successors to the non-exCEOs with a t-statistic.
-----Insert Table 1 About Here----- and the differences are significant with t-value at −3.206 for the window of (−1, 0) and −4.529 for the window of (−20, −1). The results completely flipped at the announcement and post announcement, for both short term and long term. On day 0, exCEO firms have a mean CAR of 0.98% while the non-exCEO firms have a mean CAR of 0.60%, the difference is statistically significant with a t-value of 7.399. Post announcement CARs extending to day 1 show the same pattern, with exCEO firms having a mean CAR(0, +1) of 1.69% versus 1.09% for non-exCEO firms, a significant difference with a t-value of 8.158. Longer-term effect repeat the same results, when exCEO firms have a mean CAR of 2.86%, while non-exCEO firms' mean CAR is 0.97%, with a significant t-value of 10.403 for the difference between the two groups. The significant positive difference in reaction to the hiring of an exCEO, compared to the hiring of a non-exCEO is consistent with Hypothesis 1, implying that the stock market reacts more positively to outside succession announcements when the outside successor already has CEO experience, especially
given that prior to the announcement, the results are completely the opposite.
Pre-Succession Performance
Our second hypothesis is that firms that hire an outsider who is an experienced CEO have worse financial performance than firms hiring non-experienced CEOs pre-succession. We measure the financial strength of a firm by its debt ratio and Z score. Debt ratio is calculated as total debt divided by book value of assets. Z score measures the probability of bankruptcy and we adopt the classic Altman (1968) 's definition to calculate a firm's Z score.
-----Insert Table 2 About Here----- Table 2 first lists the firm's prior performances for each of the 5 years before succession.
We can see that consistent with Hypothesis 2, firms that hired exCEOs had significantly lower Z scores (except for year −5), thus higher chance of bankruptcy than those that hired non-exCEOs. Tvalues range from 1.977 for year −4 to 3.055 for year −2. Consistently, exCEO firms also had significantly higher debt ratio (except for year −4) than those that hired non-exCEOs, with t-values ranging from −1.759 to −2.196. The findings of lower Z score and higher debt ratio echo with the larger, and more significant positive market reaction to the hiring of an experienced CEO in Table 1 .
The results suggest that the stock market welcomes the hiring of an exCEO to help turn around a poorly performing firm 2 . Therefore, consistent with previous research, there is significant industry effect and we have decided to use the industry-adjusted ROA measure. To rule out any skewed effect from outliers, we delete any number that is outside of the +/− 300% thresholds. We define ROA as net profits divided by the book value of assets and adjusted it for the industry median using four-digit SIC codes and three-digit SIC codes when there are less than three other firms in the same four-digit SIC code.
We calculate IndAdjROA for the five years leading up to the succession. Contradictory to Hypothesis 3a, IndAdjROA does not differ between the two types of origination firms with the 2 Note that the Tobin's Q values are also higher for firms that hire exCEOs, which may imply a tendency of some overvaluation of these firms. We calculate Tobin's Q using the method provided by Chung and Pruitt (1996) . 
The performance is measured in the same dimensions as in Table 2 : Tobin's Q, Z score, Debt ratio, IndAdjROA and LogTA. The superscript 'c' denotes the performance of the current firm, while 'p' denotes the performance of the previous firm. For the time frame t, we examine year −1, year −3 to −1 aggregate and year −5 to −1 aggregate performance, all relative to the succession year 0, to capture all short-term and long-term effects. That is, we estimate the probit regression three times, once for each time frame.
-----Insert Table 3 About Here----
The probit regression results appear in Table 3 . We find that successor's previous firm's size in year −1 significantly decreases the chance of the hiring of an exCEO, while the current firm's size of the same year significant increases the chance. Z score (which is inversely related to bankruptcy chance) of the current firm from year −3 to year −1 is significantly negatively related with the chance of hiring an exCEO, perhaps because the board feels more comfortable hiring an 
CEO Compensation
In H 4 we hypothesized that due to greater bargaining power, successor CEOs with prior CEO experience would receive greater total compensation than successors without CEO experience.
Total compensation is generally structured to include a fixed salary component and a performance related pay-at-risk component. We include bonus, restricted stocks and options in the pay-at-risk compensation. We examine the various components of compensation surrounding the succession for both the predecessor at year −1 and the successor at year +1 relative to the hiring year, year 0.
As a result, the compensation for the predecessor is measured in the fiscal year prior to the hiring year and the compensation for the successor is measured as of the fiscal year following the hiring year. We ignore the transition year (i.e. year 0, the year of hiring) since the transition year compensation data may include partial year compensation. In addition, year 0 compensation may include extra compensation for the successor CEO for lost options at their previous firm and may contain departure compensation for the predecessor CEO. Table 4 lists the univariate comparison in size (logTA) adjusted dollar amount compensation between the two types of successions. In the first set of columns, we compare successor compensation in year +1 for exCEOs to that of non-exCEOs. The results show that exCEO successors do not have significantly higher total compensation than non-exCEO successors ($415.4466T vs. $346.0233T with a t-value of 1.321), though they have a marginally significantly 106.0858T with a t-value of 2.214. Among the three components of pay-at-risk, bonus and options both show significant difference, but there is no significance in the difference on restricted stocks. Table 5 examines compensation in more detail: instead of comparing the two successor groups, this time, the comparison is done over time for each group. Panel A of Table 5 compares the successor pay amount in previous job with that of the new position, and Panel B of Table 5 compares the pay amount of a predecessor's with that of the successor's. Both show a statistically significant increase to the successor's pay no matter if it is from the previous job, or as compared to the predecessor; no matter it is the overall compensation amount or its component pay amount.
-----Insert Table 4 About Here-----
Because compensation is heavily affected by firm size, the numbers reported here are all firm-size adjusted.
-----Insert Table 5 About Here----- 
Post Hiring Performance
In H 5 we hypothesized that outside successors with prior experience as CEO would be more likely to have better post-succession performance than CEOs without this prior experience. So we examine the post hiring performance of the firms that hired exCEOs and those that hired nonexCEOs. We first check firm performance post succession, and then connect the performance with CEO compensation in a regression framework to see if the compensation is in anyway justified by performance.
-----Insert Table 6 About Here-----
Panel A of Table 6 shows that firms hiring exCEOs continue to experience higher Tobin's Q, lower Z score (thus higher chance of bankruptcy) and higher debt ratio than non-exCEO successor firms, exactly the same relation as pre-hiring shown in Table 2 . The higher Tobin's Q and lower Z score are statistically significant for the exCEOs than for non-exCEOs in more years than is the debt ratio. Industry adjusted ROA and size only show marginal significant difference between the two types of firms in one of the five subsequent years. Panel B of Table 6 compares the pre-to-post change of the two groups. Non-exCEO firms actually see more significant increase in industry adjusted ROA and size than exCEO firms (Table 6 Panel B). In this sense, the results from both Panel A and Panel B of Table 6 do not lend support for H 5 .
-----Insert Table 7 About Here-----
To further examine the connection between compensation and performance, we estimate a regression model with successor's compensation as the dependent variable and the ex-status of the successor and firm performance pre and post succession as the test variables. We present the results in Table 7 . The ExCEO dummy is included to see if being an exCEO introduces any upward tendency in successor compensation. The result shows that the estimated coefficient for the ExCEO (2000), whose result shows that size is about eight times more important than performance in explaining CEO pay variance.
ROBUSTNESS CHECK
Performance measures such as Tobin's Q may not be as direct a measure of managerial performance as stock returns, therefore, we replace Tobin's Q with stock returns and our results persist. Other factors such as whether the new ExCEOs are retired CEOs who perform this duty on an interim basis (which we have 23 such cases out of the 146 ExCEOs) also produce insignificant changes to our main findings. There are 11 successors in our sample due to mergers or other value enhancing actions, but the results hold after we exclude them. In addition, as reported in Section 4.2, our sample of ExCEOs depicts significant differences in industry origins, with 105 of them had prior experience in the same industry. After re-running the tests with split samples of same-industry
ExCEOs and different-industry ExCEOs, our results hold. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 new CEOs who have a peripheral functional background. We follow prior research by Chaganti and Sambharya (1987) , Murray (1989) , Michel and Hambrick (1992) and Westphal and Zajac (1995) 
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CONCLUSION
In this paper, we investigate an interesting yet mostly ignored distinction within external CEO successions: outside successors who have previous CEO experience and those who do not. We find that firms hiring a CEO with experience have higher debt ratios and higher chance of bankruptcy pre-succession than those hiring a non-exCEO. Consistently, the stock market reacts positively to succession announcements when the successor has prior CEO experience but not when the outside successor lacks this experience. Non-exCEOs come from larger firms than exCEOs, but there is generally no significant difference between the performances of their prior firms.
More surprisingly, there is no consistent results supporting a significant difference in compensation, both in amount and in structure, between an exCEO and a non-exCEO, though both increase significantly from that of the predecessor's and their previous positions. After hiring an exCEO, the successor firms still have worse financial performance than non-exCEO successor firms, and the pre-to-post change in performance indicates non-exCEO firms may even perform better between the two groups of successor firms.
Future research could focus on the cost-benefit tradeoff of hiring an exCEO. It would be interesting to examine the role of the board of directors in assessing this cost-benefit tradeoff and determining the optimal choice for the firm. An important aspect that has not been sufficiently examined in the literature is the CEO fit. Hiring an exCEO may not always be the right choice for the firm.
Given the increasing frequencies of CEO turnover, especially outside CEO successions in recent years, CEO succession, performance, and compensation remains a heavily studied topic in finance and management academia. It also remains as a heavily debated issue in popular media coverage, especially amid the current outrage over CEO compensation. Our study connects the three important aspects surrounding CEO turnover together, and helps shed further light on to this interesting yet controversial issue. T test 3.489*** 2.748** 2.577* 2.851** 2.320* "ExCEO" and "Non-ExCEO" represent the observations where the successor CEO did and did not hold the CEO position in his/her previous firm. Tobin's Q is estimated using the method provided by Chung and Pruitt (1996) . Debt ratio is total debt divided by book value of assets. Z score is measured using the classic Altman (1968)'s definition. ROA is net profits divided by the book value of assets and adjusted for the industry median using four-digit SIC codes and three-digit SIC codes when there are less than three other firms in the same four-digit SIC code (Ind.Adj.ROA). Outliers of Ind.Adj.ROA outside of +/-300% are removed from the sample. Firm size is measured by log of total assets (LogTA). †/*/**/*** indicate statistical significance at the 0.1/0.05/ 0.01/ 0.001 level. "ExCEO" represents a dummy variable equal to 1 if the successor CEO held the CEO position in his/her previous firm and 0 otherwise.
ExCEO
NonExCEO
Paired
T-test
Independent variables:
Tobin's Q is estimated using the method provided by Chung and Pruitt (1996) . Debt ratio is total debt divided by book value of assets. Z score is measured using the classic Altman (1968)'s definition. ROA is net profits divided by the book value of assets and adjusted for the industry median using four-digit SIC codes and three-digit SIC codes when there are less than three other firms in the same four-digit SIC code (Ind.Adj.ROA). Outliers of Ind.Adj.ROA outside of +/−300% are removed from the sample. Firm size is measured by log of total assets (LogTA). All the independent variables are either for year -1 or for year −3(−5) to −1 aggregate. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 Total compensation and compensation components are shown in thousands of dollars. "Successor (t=+1)" represents the successor CEO's total compensation and compensation components in the year following the succession. "Predecessor (t= −1)" represents the predecessor CEO's total compensation and compensation components in the year prior to the succession. "Previous Job (t =−1)" represents the successor CEO's total compensation and compensation components in his/her previous job in the year prior to the succession. "Total Compensation" is the sum of salary, bonus, restricted stock, and options . "Pay-at-Risk" is the summation of bonus, restricted stock, and options. "Successor Total Compensation (Post-hiring Performance)" is the dependent variable for the first regression and represents the successor CEO's total compensation for the year following the succession. "Successor Total Compensation (Prior-hiring performance)" is the dependent variable for the second regression and represents the successor CEO's total compensation in his/her previous job in the year prior to the succession. Independent variables are listed as following: "ExCEO" represents a dummy variable equal to 1 if the successor CEO held the CEO position in his/her previous firm and 0 otherwise. Tobin's Q is estimated using the method provided by Chung and Pruitt (1996) . Debt ratio is total debt divided by book value of assets. Z score is measured using the classic Altman (1968)'s definition. ROA is net profits divided by the book value of assets and adjusted for the industry median using four-digit SIC codes and three-digit SIC codes when there are less than three other firms in the same four-digit SIC code (Ind.Adj.ROA). Firm size is measured by log of total assets (LogTA). All the independent variables in the first regression are for year +1 to +3 aggregate and for the second regression for year −3 to −1 aggregate. †/*/**/*** indicate statistical significance at the 0.1/0.05/ 0.01/ 0.001 level. Year dummies from 1993 to 2008 are also included in the regressions, though their coefficient estimates are not reported to save space. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 
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